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This  paper  investigates  the  relationships  between  firm  organization  attributes,  namely  a 
structure  á  la  Chandler,  and  their  inward  looking  or  “exploitation”  attitude  in  R&D  and 
innovation.  We argue that because of sunk costs and learning processes an inward looking 
behavior is a consequence of increases in firm size.  However, it is also produced by an 
organizational model based on hierarchical managerial decisions, typical of the Chandlerian 
firms, that is not directly related to size.  We find that the US States populated by larger firms 
show a higher share of patent self-citations normalized by their share of world patents.  Even 
after controlling for firm size, a proxy for the extent of firm divisionalization in the States 
exhibits  a  significant  effect  on  patent  self-citations  normalized  by  patent  shares.    This 
supports our point that the inward looking behavior of the Chandlerian firms is not just a 
consequence of size, but also of the Chandlerian organizational model.  Among other things, 
this suggests that “exploration”, which leads to the opening of new innovation trajectories, 




Keywords: Patents, Self-citations, Chandlerian Firm, Inward looking, Inertia 
 
JEL: O32, D21   1   
1. Introduction 
Alfred  Chandler  (1977)  epitomized  the  modern  corporation  as  the  firm  that  relies  on 
managerial direction - the “visible hand” - to allocate and coordinate information flows and 
resources inside the organization.  More than 100 years ago, the Chandlerian corporation 
arose  as  the  organizational  innovation  that  allowed  for  the  government  of  increasingly 
complex business operations.  This was attained by an extensive specialization and division of 
labor inside the firm.  As a result, the Chandlerian firm exhibits a considerable degree of 
divisionalization, that is a plethora of distinct operating units and divisions, along with layers 
of low, middle, and top managers organized under hierarchical relationships. 
A common view in the literature is that the Chandlerian firms rely considerably on in-
house resources and internally generated information and knowledge assets.  A related feature 
is that they are more likely to “exploit” their existing business lines and R&D trajectories 
rather than “exploring” new ones (Levinthal and March, 1993).  Several empirical studies 
have confirmed that the Chandlerian firms prefer exploitation to exploration investments (e.g. 
Henderson, 1993; Dougherthy and Heller, 1994; Christensen, 1997), unlike for instance small 
and young firms or more generally entrepreneurial environments in which there is greater use 
of knowledge and resources external to the individual organization (e.g. Saxenian, 1994).  
These  features  of  the  managerial  firm  are  not  less  important  today.    According  to  the 
specialized press, the large divisionalized corporations are dedicating an increasing share of 
their R&D expenditures to the extension of existing business lines (e.g. The Economist, 2004; 
Business Week, 2004).   
The  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  show  empirically  that  the  Chandlerian  organizations 
exhibit a greater propensity to rely on their own internal knowledge.  Our analysis builds upon 
the seminal studies by Nelson (1961; 1982) and Arrow (1974; 1975) who highlighted how 
organizational  forms  -  i.e.  hierarchies  of  managers,  layers  of  divisions  -  affect  R&D   2   
directions and economic outcomes.  We discuss two propositions.  The first proposition says 
that the propensity to use internal knowledge assets and information increases with the size of 
the firm.  The rationale for this proposition is that the larger the firm the greater the sunk costs 
and  the  learning  opportunities,  which  produce  a  greater  bias  towards  improving  existing 
trajectories rather than moving onto new ones.  The second proposition is that a Chandlerian 
organizational  structure,  viz.  a  more  extensive  divisionalization and  a greater  reliance  on 
hierarchical managerial layers, also induces a greater use of internal knowledge.  Here we 
argue that, for an equal total investment in R&D, the Chandlerian corporation invests more 
resources per project than a set of independent firms.  This implies greater scale and learning 
effects at the level of the individual projects or trajectories, which reinforces the bias in favor 
of  established  R&D  or  innovation  lines.    Moreover,  it  has  been  shown  that  the  upper 
managers  who  select  project  and  research  trajectories  have  cognitive  biases  that  favor 
activities in which they have greater experience. 
To test these propositions, we employ data for 52 US States (50 States plus DC and 
Portorico).  Our measure of the inward looking attitude of the Chandlerian firms is the share 
of patent self-citations (backward citations of patents by the same assignee) in a given State 
normalized by the share of world patents assigned to the State (the State of the first inventor is 
used to assign patents to States).  We show that, after controlling for several factors, our 
normalized share of self-citations is positively correlated with measures of the States firm size 
distribution, which account for the presence of larger firms.  It is also positively correlated 
with the average number of subsidiaries (divisions) of the firms divided by the firm sales, 
taken as a measure of the diffusion of Chandlerian organization models in the State.  The 
latter result is important as it shows that there is an impact of an organizational structure à la 
Chandler that is not just implied by firm size.   3   
We employed State-level data, instead of company data, because of the limitations in 
the availability of financial data and other controls for the smaller firms, and especially for the 
non-quoted  ones.    Chandlerian  organizations  are  correlated  with  firm-size,  and  size  is 
correlated with the availability of firm-level data.  By selecting our sample of firms according 
to the availability of data, we would select it on the dependent variable, which would produce 
biased estimates of the impacts of the covariates unless one engages in complicated regression 
structures to account for the truncation.  We wanted to avoid such a heavy statistical structure 
to pick patterns in the data without filtering them through elaborate statistical assumptions.  
Our aggregation at the level of States preserves the breadth of the sample of total patents, and 
particularly it does not entail a bias in favor of the large firms, while enabling us to employ a 
good set of controls in our regressions.  
To summarize, we see the following contributions of this paper to the literature.  First, 
it brings further evidence on the idea that “organization matters”, and particularly that the 
R&D outcomes of one large Chandlerian firm can be different from the outcome of several 
entrepreneurial firms, even if the total R&D investment is the same.
1  Second, we try to 
explain the inward looking attitude and related inertial behavior of the Chandlerian firms 
(Hodgkinson, 1997).  There is an empirical literature that correlates size with the attitude of 
firms towards exploitation (for a review see Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001), but to our knowledge 
there have been only few attempts, mainly based on case studies, to explain why we should 
observe  it  (Floyd  and  Wooldrige,  1997;  Christensen,  1997;  Trispas  and  Gavetti,  2000; 
Danneels, 2002).  Moreover, we distinguish between the effects of size per sè vis-à-vis those 
of the organizational characteristics of the firm.  Third, the paper sheds new light on some 
empirical regularity that until now have received little attention, namely the under-studied 
portion  of  patent  citations,  the  self-citations,  as  instruments  to  proxy  for  intra-firm 
                                                
1 Nelson (1961), Ghemawat (1991) and Henderson (1993) reached the same conclusions.   4   
technological competences and spillovers.  This could open new empirical trajectories in this 
field  of  study.    Finally,  this  paper  shows  how  organizational  factors  could  be  strictly 
interrelated  with,  and  can  be  used  to  explain,  some  empirical  regularity  observed  at  the 
regional level. 
Section II builds on the literature on Chandlerian corporations and R&D to derive our 
main propositions about the effects of size and organizational characteristics on the inward 
looking  behavior  of  firms.   Section  III  describes  the  data,  while  Section  IV  presents the 
empirical results.  Section V concludes. 
 
2. The Visible Hand and the Direction of R&D Outcomes 
2.1 The effect of firm size on the use of internal knowledge  
Large and complex managerial firms carry out many projects at once, and they have sunk 
costs in projects started in earlier periods.  With sunk costs, existing business lines or research 
trajectories may be pursued over alternative opportunities in new areas even when the net 
profits of the latter are higher.  This is a classical argument about sunk costs.  Because the 
cost is sunk when the new opportunity arrives, it is not taken into account when comparing 
the two alternatives, which raises the current profitability of the trajectory whose costs are 
sunk.  To fix ideas, suppose that there is a sunk cost K paid in the past, and that this produces 
current gross profit of a business line equal to v > z, where the latter is the net profit of a new 
business line whose sunk cost has not yet been paid.  Because v > z, the firm will stay with its 
trajectory that produces net profits v – K even if v – K < z.  By contrast, if K was not sunk, 
and v – K < z, it would undertake the trajectory z.  Larger and more complex Chandlerian 
firms, which have sunk costs in several activities, will then have a tendency to stick to their 
old businesses rather than moving onto new ones.    5   
The same applies if there is project- or trajectory-specific learning over time or if there 
are spillovers across concurrent projects or R&D trajectories rather than sunk costs (see e.g. 
Henderson and Cockburn, 1996).  With learning, the profitability of an existing business line 
improves.  Other things being equal, this makes it more advantageous to stay with the existing 
trajectories.  Similarly, if a project benefits from spillovers from other projects of the firm, 
then other things being equal, it is more likely to be chosen vis-à-vis other trajectories in 
which the firm does not enjoy similar spillovers.  The trajectories in which the firm enjoys 
economies of scope are typically those that are closer technically or from other perspectives 
(e.g.  commercial,  manufacturing).    In  turn,  these  are  more  likely  to  be  trajectories  that 
improve upon existing fields or areas of research than distant new fields or operations (see 
also Teece et al., 1994). 
The foregoing arguments find confirmation in the literature.  Arrow (1974) suggested 
that firms prefer to use existing information assets, even if they are less efficient, because of 
the costs of abandoning the old trajectories for the new ones.  Henderson (1993) empirically 
confirms  that  incumbent  diversified  firms  in  photolithographic  industry  have  a  greater 
incentive  to  invest  in  incremental  innovation.    More  generally,  when  the  costs  of  using 
existing assets are lower than developing new ones, the incentives to remain in old well-
defined research trajectories could be substantial (see for example Abernathy, 1978).  At the 
same  time,  the  magnitude  of  the  sunk  costs,  the  extent  of  the  learning  processes,  or  the 
number of projects with potential spillovers, are higher the larger the firm.  Thus, larger firm 
are more likely to be affected by the factors mentioned above that induce them to persist in 
their established R&D trajectories.  In turn, this means that the larger the firm the more likely 
it is that it relies on internal knowledge assets.  This leads to our first Proposition. 
Propostion 1.  Larger firms rely to a greater extent on internal knowledge assets.    6   
2.2 A logical outcome of the visible hand mechanism 
Apart from size, hierarchies, division of labor and project selection offer a simple explanation 
of the Chandlerian tendency to expand investments on the projects that have already been 
launched.  A stylized fact is that the Chandlerian corporations organize R&D in two phases: a 
preliminary phase where project proposals are assessed and selected, and a second phase 
where  the  selected  projects  are  carried  out  (Nelson,  1961  and  1982;  Loch  et  al.,  2001).  
Typically, the upper managers are specialized in the supervision and selection of the projects, 
while hierarchically lower units composed of middle-low managers submit the proposals and 
carry  out  the  projects.    Chandler  (1980)  himself  wrote  that  the  modern  divisionalized 
corporations separate “those who make the decisions about the firm’s operations and those 
who own its means” (p.15). 
This model of organizing R&D produces concentration of a given R&D budget on 
fewer projects and research trajectories.  In fact, the most important task of the top-level 
managers is to avoid duplication in research trajectories and cannibalization among similar 
projects (Nelson, 1961; Loch et al., 2001).  The selecting managers then try to pull together 
investments and researchers into selected project trajectories.  It is straightforward that the 
unification of different efforts on restricted research paths increases the investments in each 
line of research.  Another reason is that the specializations of the two types of managers lead 
to asymmetric information and related agency problems.  Fewer projects are then selected 
compared  to  smaller  firms  in  which  the  organizational  distance  between  promoters  and 
selecting managers is smaller (Arrow, 1983; Holmstrom, 1989).  Finally, the very fact that 
another party checks a given project makes it less likely that it is approved simply because a 
second check can spot reasons why the project is not worth or drawbacks that the original 
proposing agent did not see: “two eyes are better than one” (see also Sah and Stiglitz, 1988).   7   
As an example, take two firms with the same ex-ante fixed R&D budget denoted by R 
that have to choose among N different project proposals to fund.  One firm behaves like the 
classical Chandlerian firm with the ex-ante project review and selection, and the other like N 
separated and independent divisions.  The first one will chose K < N projects to launch, 
investing on average R/K money in each project.  The second firm will invest R/N.  The 
underling  assumption  that  the firm  R&D  budget  is  fixed  before  the  selection  decision  is 
reasonable and it is confirmed empirically by the stability of the firm R&D intensity over 
time, especially for the large firms (see Halliday et al., 1997; Eberhart et al., 2004). 
With fewer  projects per  unit  of R&D budget,  the  Chandlerian mechanism implies 
greater concentration of the same amount of knowledge in a smaller number of areas than the 
equivalent set of independent firms.  In addition, the concentration in fewer areas gives rise to 
scale economies and increasing returns on the launched project trajectories.  For the reasons 
suggested when we discussed Proposition 1, this reinforces the tendency to stay with existing 
lines of business or research, and hence to rely on the knowledge base of the firm.  While in 
the discussion of Proposition 1 the scale economies and increasing returns on existing projects 
stemmed  from  the  size  of  the  firm,  in  this  case  they  are  produced  by  the  patterns  of 
Chandlerian R&D  selection,  which  produces  a larger  investment  of  the  R&D  budget  per 
project.  This leads to our second Proposition. 
Propostion  2.    Firms  organized  under  tighter  Chandlerian  models,  viz.  extensive 
divisionalization and hierarchical selection of projects, rely to a greater extent on internal 
knowledge assets. 
2.3 Cognitive biases of the visible hand 
Given the hierarchical structure of the decision process in Chandlerian organizations, any 
cognitive bias of the visible hand should affects the directions of the firm R&D trajectories.  
Nelson (1982) and March (1988) have already highlighted the link between the knowledge of   8   
the manager teams specialized in project selection and the R&D outcomes.  Arrow (1974) 
stated that long-term patterns in an organization appear when “[new] information available 
somewhere in the organization [...] is not used by the authority”. (p. 74).  The cognitive biases 
of the selecting managers provide an additional argument for Proposition 2.  Thus, without 
developing any new proposition, we do stress the cognitive biases of the selecting managers 
because, as we will see, they are an important part of the story why the Chandlerian firms use 
internal knowledge. 
Recently, Kaplan et al. (2003) have stressed how the conservative attitude of mental 
models in high hierarchical levels of managers affect firm R&D directions.  They have shown 
that the speed at which large pharmaceutical companies started to patent in biotechnology was 
influenced by the mental schemes of the top managers.  The limitations in the cognitive maps 
of the coordinating managers could lead to inertial decisions, even when the potential project 
portfolio  is  heterogeneous.    In  this  respect,  the  difficulties  to  cope  with  breakthrough 
innovations have found easy explanations (Hodgkinson, 1997; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1997; 
Trispas and  Gavetti,  2000),  especially  when the coordination  managers  tend  to  be  senior 
employees whose pool of knowledge is relatively aged.  If the knowledge embedded in the 
selection  managers  is  limited,  their  decisions  will  follow  specific  paths  and  they  will  be 
regular and predictable (Filkeenstein and Hambrick, 1988). 
Burgelman  (1994)  provides  an  illuminating  example.    He  analyzes  the  managers’ 
attitude in Intel during the transition from the DRAM memories to microprocessor business. 
He  shows  how  the  microprocessor,  an  unplanned  innovation,  was  hampered  by  the  top 
managers who defended DRAMs as the Intel core business.  They continued to fund DRAM 
projects  as  much  as  other  more  successful  businesses.    It  was  puzzling  that  the  top 
management  rejected  at  least  two  microprocessors  project  proposals  to  fund  instead 
investments in DRAMs in the two years before Intel finally abandoned the DRAM business.     9   
By contrast, the low-middle level managers were not in accord with the top management’s 
view and lobbied for the Intel  shift to microprocessors.   Ex-post, the top-level managers 
mentioned that they found it difficult to deviate from their established criteria for internal 
project selection.  They had established project evaluation criteria that by were designed to 
always favor existing R&D lines.   
This attitude of the top managers can be cast in the framework of the previous section.  
The cognitive bias implies that, other things being equal, the selecting managers will exhibit a 
higher probability of accepting a project in an established field than a project in a new area.  
One  explanation  of  this  behavior  is  that  the  top  managers  develop  specialized  learning 
capabilities that enable them to have more information and a greater ability to assess existing 
product lines.  Since they do not have experience in the new areas, they tend to reject new 
projects.  In the previous section we cited Arrow (1983) and Holmstrom (1989) who stressed 
asymmetric  information  problems  and  agency  costs  in  larger  firms  when  it  comes  to 
launching new projects.  A typical case widely emphasized in the literature is that the low-
middle management has more information, relationships, and links with the users, while the 
selection manager team is more distant from the downstream source of knowledge (Floyd and 
Wooldridge, 1997). 
In sum, the inward looking attitude of the Chandlerian firms could stem from the 
knowledge  limitation  of  the  top-level  selecting  managers  who  tend  to  replicate  the  same 
cognitive scheme.  According to the view rooted in Levinthal and March (1993), inward 
looking stems from the bounded knowledge of the decision managers.  It takes place even if 
the low-middle level project managers submit a wide portfolio of projects based on different 
source of information (external and internal).  Of course, the cognitive limitation is only a 
necessary condition.  If the organization of the firm were not based on a division of labor   10   
structured in layers of managers with different level of authority, this limitation would not 
affect the R&D trajectories. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics  
3.1 Data sources 
We used patent data from the NBER US Patent Citation Dataset (Hall et al., 2001).  To 
produce descriptive statistics we selected all the US patents granted from 1980 to 1999.  For 
the  regressions  we  employed  the  sub-sample  of  patents  granted  during  1995-99.  We 
interpreted the US State of the first inventor as the “State” of the patent.   
Patent self-citations are our proxy for intra-firm knowledge spillovers.  Citations imply 
that the citing patent builds upon knowledge in the cited patent.  There are backward and 
forward citations.  Usually backward citations (citations made) are viewed by the literature as 
a proxy of knowledge spillovers, because if patent X cited patent Y this could indicate a flow 
of knowledge between the two innovations (Jaffe et al., 1993 and 1998; Mowery et al., 1998; 
Gittelman and Kogut, 2003, Ziedonis, 2004).  Forward citations (citations received) are often 
used to analyze the importance and the value of the patents (Haroff et al, 1999).  We employ 
backward citations.  Self-citations take place when the previous inventions cited belong to the 
same assignee of the citing patent.  According to Hall et al. (2001) self-citations “represent 
transfers of knowledge that are mostly internalized” (p.19).  In this respect, a firm propensity 
to self-citation is a good proxy of the inward looking attitude of an organization, since it 
measures  the  propensity  to  create  new  knowledge  from  previously  developed  internal 
knowledge.  So far, the only available evidence in this field is provided by Hall et al. (2001) 
who found a higher share of self-citations (about 20%) in the Chemicals and Drugs sector, 
which is dominated by large divisionalized firms.  By contrast, Ziedonis (2004) observes that   11   
in the semiconductor industry, which was recently characterized by an increasing division of 
labor and vertical disintegration, the average ratio of self-citations is 9.3%.
2 
The NBER database provides two measures of the ratio between self-citations and 
total citations, a lower bound and an upper bound.  Since the assignee’s name is not given for 
the patents granted before 1969, it is not possible to count the self-citations for these patents.  
Thus, we computed the share of self-citations either on the total sample patent (lower bound, 
LBC), or on the sub-sample of patents granted after 1969 (upper bound, UBC).  
From the Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database, which contains data for more than one 
million US companies, we downloaded the number of employees of all the US firms by State.  
For each firm we counted its number of subsidiaries in the same US State, its turnover, and 
we identified the US State of location.  The total number of firms in the sample is 1,382,732.  
The rationale for this data collection is to proxy for Chandlerian-ness with the fatness of the 
right  tail  of  the  firm  size  distribution  of  each  US  State.    From  the  same  database,  we 
downloaded for each State the average book value of plants and propriety and the number of 
employees classified by sector (2 digit SIC code).  Finally, from the database “State & County 
Quick-Facts” of the US Census Bureau we obtained several control variables by State for the 
year  2000,  viz.  population,  income  per  capita,  the  share  of  employees  with  a  Bachelor' s 
degree, the State land area and the State R&D expenditures.  
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Between  1980  and  1999  the  US  Patent  Office  granted  746,808  citing  patents  that  cite 
7,799,893 cited patents.  The average percentage of self-citations in this period is 15.1% for 
UBC and 11.9% for LBC, with a standard deviation of 0.26 and 0.22 respectively.  Graph 1 
compares, for the sample period, the trends of the average UBC and LBC against the ratio 
                                                
2 In other industries this percentage is much higher.  For example, in the Coating industry the average rate of 
self-citations is over 50%.   12   
between citations and patents (citation intensity) and patent and assignees.  The number of 
patents per assignee is  constant throughout the period, while the number of citations per 
patent increases steadily.  The share of self-citations decreases significantly until the end of 
the  80s,  and  then  remains  stable.    This  suggests  that  the  share  of  self-citations  was  not 
strongly affected by the “explosion” in the number of citations per patent, especially in the 
most recent years.  To check for the stability of self-citations, Graphs 2a and 2b report the 
first four moments of LBC and UBC.  The two series look stable over time. 
[Graphs 1, 2a and 2b about here] 
Before moving to our regressions we perform some additional tests on our data to 
strengthen the importance of the issues that we want to focus upon in this paper.  We first 
show that the share of self-citations exhibits a greater heterogeneity across firms than across 
technological fields.  Technological fields could have different propensity to self-citation.  For 
example, more codified knowledge bases are easier to transfer across organizations.  As a 
result, the corresponding technological fields could exhibit fewer self-citations than others 
that  rely  on  more  tacit  knowledge  assets.    To  test  technology  versus  firm  effects,  we 
performed an analysis of variance using the technological class dummies and the assignee 
dummies.  Given that from 1995 to 1999 there are more than 16,000 assignees, we adopted a 
conservative approach and selected as dummy-assignees only those with patents in more than 
5 different technological classes.  We ended up with 673 firm and 408 technological class 
dummies.  Our results show that firm effects overwhelm technological class effect.  With an 
R
2  of  0.301  and  UBC  as  the  dependent  variable,  the  percentage  of  the  model  variance 
explained  by  firm  dummies  is  26.6% vs  1.3%  explained  by  technological class  dummies 
(24.8% vs 1.11% for LBC). 
To confirm these findings, we calculated for all the assignees the average LBC and 
UBC in every year to test for the extent of the heterogeneity of the share of self-citations   13   
across firms.  Table 1 summarizes the findings.  Looking at the standard deviation, mean and 
skewness,  the  heterogeneity  among  the  assignees  is  high  and  persistent  over  time.    The 
average ratio between standard deviation and mean is 2.45 for the whole period.  This implies 
that there are organizations that persistently cite their patents, and firms that do not rely much 
on self-citations.  
[Table 1 about here] 
One of the motivations of our work is that the large firms have a higher share of self-
citation compared to the share of their patents, while this is not true for smaller firms that do 
not rely as much on tight Chandlerian organizations.  Table 2 corroborates this evidence.  We 
selected the 15 most important USPTO technological classes by number of patents granted, 
along with the assignee with the highest number of patents in each class.  For these assignees 
and each USPTO class, we computed their shares of patents in the class over the total patents 
in the same class, and the share of self-citations of their patents in the class.  If all the patents 
in a class were equally likely to be cited, the share of self-citations and the share of patents 
held over the patents in the same class ought to be roughly similar.  But Table 2 shows that 
for the top patent holders the former is well higher than the latter.  It also shows that the ratio 
between the average share of self-citations for all the assignees in the same class and their 
share of patents is smaller than for the top patent holder.  Thus, not only are the leading firms 
more likely to cite themselves, but also this behavior is not similar to the average patent 
holder in the class.  This provides evidence of the fact that the larger firms have a higher 
propensity to self-citations.   
[Table 2 about here] 
Finally,  we  provide  some  statistics  by  US  State  on  the  right  tail  of  the  firm  size 
distribution.  Table 3 shows that the US States differ considerably in terms of number of firms   14   
with more than 2,500 employees.  It also shows that they differ in terms of the number of 
subsidiaries of these firms in the same State.   
[Table 3 about here] 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Methodology 
As noted in the previous section, we want to assess the extent of the share of self-citations of 
any given assignee beyond the unconditional probability to cite one of its own patents.  A 
company with more patents is naturally more likely to cite its own patents simply because 
there is a higher base of patents to be cited.  Our point is instead that, because of inherent 
features of their organizational model, Chandlerian firms are more likely to use their internal 
knowledge, and hence to self-cite, even after controlling for the fact that they may have more 
patents (or a greater knowledge from which to draw new knowledge).  The methodology that 
we illustrate below rests on the idea that if all patents are equally likely to be cited, then the 
share of self-citations by any firm should be equal to the share of patents of that firm over all 
the patents.  If self-citations are higher, then the firm has a higher propensity to self-cite, 
while the opposite would be true if the share of self-citations was lower than their share of 
patents.  
Denote Si to be the share of self-citations of the firm “i” and Pi the share of patents of 
the same firm on total patents.  Then 
Si = ￿i ￿ Pi                   (1) 
where ￿ indicates any firm specific factor that alters  the equal probability of citing  your 
patents.  The proportionality factor ￿ equals to 1 if there is no bias in self-citations.   
Before moving to our State-level regressions, we assessed equation (1) empirically by 
using 1995-1999 patent data and by running a robust OLS regression at the assignee level   15   
with 9,333 observations.  The form of the OLS regression is  Si = ￿ + ￿ Pi+ ￿i, where ￿ is the 
constant  and  ￿i  is  the  error.    The  regression  also  controlled for  technological  class fixed 
effects.  The estimated ￿ is 3.75, and it is significant at the 5% level of significance.  The F 
test  (F=21.15)  clearly  rejected  the  null  hypothesis  that  ￿  =  1.    This  corroborates  our 
assumption  that  there  is  a  positive  bias  towards  self-citations  in  the  firm  citing  patterns.  
Unfortunately we could not expand this regression analysis further because of the lack of 
controls  for  several  firms  in  our  sample  of  assignees.    As  noted  in  the  Introduction,  we 
preferred to work by aggregating data at the level of US States where we could obtain better 
and more extensive controls that may affect the propensity to self-citations.  
We structured our regression model as  
Si / Pi = ￿i  with  ￿i  = g(xi)          (2) 
where x is the vector of predictors and controls.  From this specification we can aggregate by 
summing  over  all  the  firms  in  a  State.    Given  the  additive  functional  form,  we  can  use 
averages at the US State level  
￿ ￿





i P S h /             (3) 
where  ￿  is  the  US  State  where  the  firm  is  located.    We  hypothesize  that  this  linear 
aggregation from firm to US States does not introduce any significant bias.  
Before we move further we would like to address another issue.  A factor that may 
alter the rate of self-citations is the value of the patents.  If the Chandlerian firms held more 
valuable patents, they could cite themselves to a greater extent not because of their inward 
looking attitude, but because their patents are more valuable.  We think that this is not a 
serious problem in our analysis.  First, as we shall see in Section 4.2 below, we use the State 
R&D intensity as a control for the value of the State patents.  Second, if anything, the smaller 
firms hold more valuable patents on average.  There are theoretical reasons, i.e. the costs of 
patenting (e.g. patent fees, administrative costs) are relatively higher for the smaller firms,   16   
which encourages them to patent only more valuable innovations.  There is also empirical 
evidence.  As discussed in Section 3.1, the number of forward citations by other patents is a 
common proxy for patent value.  A recent study by the US Small Business Administration 
showed  that  for  the  small  firm  patents  the  number  of  forward  citations  averaged  1.53 
compared to 1.19 for the large firms (SBA, 2003).  Thus, the bias on self-citations produced 
by  the  heterogeneity  of  patent  values  across  organizations  could  go  even  against  the 
propensity of the Chandlerian firms to cite themselves. 
 
4.2 Dependent variables and predictors 
As dependent variables we employ the average share of patent self-citations by US State 
calculated on the patents granted from 1995 to 1999 standardized by the share of firm patent 
on total patents.  We utilize a five-year average to smooth our measure with respect to year-
to-year variations.
3  The differences among US States and the propensity to self-cite for each 
State are stable over time, as Table 4 shows.  We have 52 observations.  For simplicity, we 
report only the results obtained by using the upper bound self-citation measure (SELF) as the 
dependent variable.  We obtained similar results with the lower bound measure.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Our four key covariates are: i) the estimated alpha parameter of a Pareto distribution 
fitted on each State firm size distribution of firm employees (ALPHA); ii) the average of State 
firm size distribution (AVG); iii) the skewness coefficient of the State firm size distribution 
(SKEW); and iv) the State average of the firm level ratios between the number of subsidiaries 
of the firms and their sales (DEPT).  Each measure is calculated for 2000.   
                                                
3 Our results, however, are consistent across different sample periods, like 1996-1999 and 1997-1999.   17   
The Pareto distribution is utilized in the literature to estimate the firm size distribution 
because it is a heavy-tailed distribution (Axtell, 2001). The Pareto distribution has a density 
function of the form  
P(x)= ￿￿
￿/x
(￿+1)             (4) 
where x is a random variable such that x > b, and a and b are the distribution parameters.
4  
The parameter a is the “shape” parameter.  Precisely, if ￿ decreases the right tail of the Pareto 
distribution  becomes  fatter.    So,  in  a  preliminary  step,  we  estimated  for  each  State  the 
parameter a of the Pareto distribution and we used it as a predictor.  This was done by 
performing  for  each  of  the  52  States  a  non-linear  OLS  estimation  of  the  cumulative 
distribution function of (4), which takes the form F(x) = 1 – (b/x)
a.  The observations for F(x) 
are the relative frequencies of firms of size smaller or equal to x (where x is the number of 
employees), while the class x is the corresponding covariate in the right-hand side of the 
equations.  The parameters a and b are then estimated.  The regression results in Table 7 do 
not change when a was estimated using different size aggregation levels, precisely i) bins 
with width increasing  in the power of  three; ii) ten size classes according to distribution 
percentiles.
5  Compared to a, AVG and SKEW are less accurate proxies for the fatness of the 
right tail of the firm size distribution in the States, but all three covariates are intended to 
measure  the  presence  of  larger  firms  in  the  State.    In  this  respect,  we  use  them  to  test 
Proposition 1.   
DEPT  is  instead  a  measure  of  Chandlerian-ness  that  is  more  independent  of  size.  
Argyres (1996) used the number of subsidiaries standardized by size as a proxy of the firm 
divisionalization intensity, viz. an organizational property of the firms with complex layers of 
managers and hierarchical relationships.  To adopt a conservative approach, we selected only 
                                                
4 The ￿ parameter is the distribution position parameter and it allows for the estimation of ￿ controlling for the 
distribution mean. 
5 See for more technical details Crovella et al (1998). As they show, different levels of aggregation tend to affect 
the ￿ parameter, while they do not significantly influence ￿.   18   
the subsidiaries in the same State of the parent company.  This rules out subsidiaries that only 
promote and distribute firm products in distant markets, and hence avoids that our share of 
subsidiaries proxy for the internationalization or the spatial spread of the companies.  We then 
use DEPT to test Proposition 2. 
As control variables, we used the population (POP) of the States in 2000 as a proxy for 
its size.
6  We employed the percentage of the population with a Bachelor’s degree (BACH), a 
measure of the State supply of skill, because States with a more educated population are more 
likely to produce technology-based products and innovations.  State R&D intensity is another 
control.  We use the ratio between State R&D expenditures and GDP in 2000 (R&D).  As 
noted  earlier,  this controls  for  the  value  (quality)  of  the  patents  in  the  State.    The  State 
population  density  (DENS)  accounts  for  local  knowledge  spillovers.    Firms  in  highly 
populated  areas  can  internalize  external  knowledge  to  a  greater  extent  because  of 
geographical proximity.  To control for State industry characteristics, we follow Ziedonis 
(2004) who employed the US State average capital intensity (KAP) measured as the ratio of 
the  book  value  of  firm  plants  and  property  and  the  number  of  employees.    Table  5 
summarizes our description of variables, while Table 6 shows their basic statistics.   
[Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
The use of panel data would not add much to our analysis.  Most of our variables, both 
the dependent and independent variables, do not vary substantially over time, and sizable 
longitudinal differences would only arise in the long run.  In the regressions we use a log-log 
specification: Dependent and independent variables are in logs. 
 
                                                
6 In unreported regressions, we observed that the State population and the State GDP play the same role. For the 
sake of simplicity, we show only the regression with POP.   19   
4.3 Results 
Table 7 reports our regression results.  Our hypotheses are supported by the data.  Our proxies 
for Chandlerian-ness, ALPHA, AVG, SKEW and DEPT, are significant and they have the 
expected sign.  Specifically, a lower (higher) value of ALPHA (AVG or SKEW) yields a 
higher  share  of  self-citations  over  the  share  of  State  patents.    DEPT  has  a  positive  and 
significant effect even when we control for the fatness of the firm size distribution through 
ALPHA, AVG or SKEW (see Table 7, Models II, IV and VI).  In short, there is an impact of 
divisionalization on the inward looking behavior of the firms that is not just equivalent to firm 
size.  The organizational dimension matters.  If we keep all the other variables at their mean 
values, a standard deviation increase (from the mean) in ALPHA, AVG, SKEW and DEPT in 
models I, III, V and VII of Table 7 produce an increase in SELF of 9.6%, 4.5%, 5.4% and 
2.8% respectively.  
[Table 7 about here] 
All the other covariates do not need any special discussion; they are employed just as 
controls.  But one interesting result, when significant, is that the share of population with a 
bachelor degree, as a proxy for human capital in the State, has a negative impact on the 
dependent variable.  One explanation is that people with higher human capital are more likely 
to search for knowledge inputs from external sources rather than looking primarily at their 
experience within their organizations.  Interestingly enough, the R&D intensity has a slightly 
significant impact on self-citations only in one regression out of seven.  This suggests that 
there is no strong impact of a measure of the potential value of patents on the dependent 
variable.  Probably, the aggregation at the State  level flattens the effects of  the value  of 
patents on self-citations.   
   20   
5. Conclusions 
This  paper  investigated  the  relationships  between  firm  organization  attributes,  namely  a 
structure á la Chandler, and their inward looking/exploitation attitude in the development of 
innovations.  By using US State level data, we found that the US States with a fatter right tail 
of  their  firm  size  distribution  display  on  average  a  higher  share  of  patent  self-citations 
normalized by the patents attributed to the State.  Moreover, even after controlling for the 
effects of firm size, a proxy for the extent of the divisionalization of the firms in the State 
displays a significant effect on patent self-citations, which suggests that organizational factors 
are also important.   
By building upon previous studies in the literature, we provide some explanations for 
these stylized facts.  First, size implies greater sunk costs at the level of individual projects, 
and  a  greater  number  of  projects  that  can  give  rise  to  economies  of  scope  in  related 
trajectories  of  diversification.    Scale economies,  learning  processes,  and  spillovers  across 
similar projects provide a greater encouragement to persist on similar product or technological 
trajectories.  Second, the Chandlerian decision process, based on managerial hierarchies, is 
such that the decision to carry out projects in known areas tends to be favored vis-à-vis the 
decision to launch new projects.  Thus, our results strongly support the view that organization 
design shapes the long run behavior of firms.  Especially for the large firms this is key to 
understand  the  question  of  their  inertia  pointed  out  by  the  literature.    Incidentally,  the 
government  of  the  firm  human  resources  should  deal  with  the  top  managers  overly 
dependence  on  their  consolidated  mental  models  (e.g.  through  top  managers  rotation,  or 
training), especially in organization that are vertically structured (Hodgkinson, 1997).  The 
paper also sheds new light on some empirical regularity that until now have received little 
attention, namely the under-studied portion of patent citations - self-citations - as instruments 
to proxy for intra-firm technological competences and spillovers.   21   
Our  findings  encourage  additional  research  in  several  directions.  We  could  not 
perform a firm level analysis because of the lack of data especially for small unquoted firms.  
But relating self-citation intensity with firm size and firm-level organization measures and 
controls  is  the  direction  to  go,  provided  that  suitable  data  at  this  level  can  be  collected.  
Moreover,  we  proposed  two  explanations  to  motivate  the  inward  looking  attitude  of 
Chandlerian firms.    Future  work  matching  firm  controls,  along  with  patent,  inventor  and 
regional data, could provide a better assessment of these two explanations, along with greater 
and more specific details about them.  It can also provide a richer set of explanations than we 
were able to do in this paper.   
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Table 1: Share of self-citations per assignee, 1980-99 
  Upper bound  Lower bound 
Year  Average  Stand.Dev  Skewness  Average  Stand.Dev  Skewness 
1980-89  0.075  0.177  0.019  0.045  0.111  0.013 
1990  0.060  0.151  0.014  0.041  0.108  0.012 
1991  0.067  0.161  0.014  0.046  0.117  0.012 
1992  0.063  0.148  0.014  0.043  0.106  0.012 
1993  0.065  0.154  0.013  0.045  0.112  0.011 
1994  0.062  0.145  0.012  0.044  0.108  0.010 
1995  0.064  0.142  0.011  0.045  0.107  0.010 
1996  0.065  0.151  0.011  0.047  0.113  0.010 
1997  0.066  0.146  0.010  0.047  0.110  0.009 
1998  0.061  0.143  0.011  0.045  0.109  0.010 
1999  0.062  0.143  0.010  0.046  0.110  0.009 
Source: Our elaboration on NBER Patent Database 
 
Table 2: Top assignee in the largest 15 USPTO technological classes in terms of patent 
granted, their share of self-citations in the class, and the average share of self-









































in the class 
 
 
73  General Electric  0.019  0.361  0.326  0.086  0.071 
210  Pall Corp.  0.021  0.263  0.212  0.110  0.090 
257  IBM  0.092  0.260  0.249  0.130  0.126 
280  Morton Int.  0.075  0.178  0.167  0.107  0.085 
340  Motorola  0.056  0.323  0.308  0.116  0.099 
345  IBM  0.148  0.230  0.209  0.098  0.093 
361  IBM  0.061  0.260  0.249  0.109  0.100 
424  Procter & Gamble  0.044  0.327  0.292  0.146  0.132 
428  Minnesota Mining  0.063  0.380  0.315  0.173  0.153 
435  Incyte Pharma  0.029  0.121  0.120  0.119  0.103 
438  Micron Tech.  0.130  0.182  0.178  0.122  0.119 
514  Eli Lilly  0.059  0.461  0.437  0.224  0.211 
600  H&P  0.025  0.338  0.326  0.084  0.071 
604  Procter & Gamble  0.049  0.327  0.292  0.110  0.087 
606  US Surgical Corp.  0.048  0.247  0.190  0.087  0.063 
  Average  0.055  0.288  0.262  0.122  0.108 
  Stand. Dev.  0.030  0.090  0.083  0.035  0.037 
Source: Our elaboration on NBER Patent Database   27   
 
 
Table 3: Firms with more than 2,500 employees by US State in 2000 
  Average  Dev. Stand.  Skewness  Min  Max 
Number of firms  140.66  169.15  1.71  0  686 
Number of subsidiaries  1260.17  1943.13  2.36  0  9,697 
Source: Our elaboration on Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS Database 
 
Table 4: Average share of self-citations by US State, 1995-1999 
  Years 
  Upper Bound 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  1995-99 
Average  0.115  0.116  0.121  0.112  0.11  0.114 
Dev. Stand.  0.046  0.049  0.053  0.041  0.114  0.038 
Max  0.251  0.242  0.333  0.229  0.214  0.234 
Min  0.008  0  0.019  0.011  0.028  0.038 
  Lower Bound 
Average  0.095  0.098  0.103  0.096  0.094  0.097 
Dev. Stand.  0.044  0.043  0.045  0.038  0.038  0.035 
Max  0.224  0.218  0.285  0.21  0.203  0.21 
Min  0.007  0  0.024  0.011  0.032  0.033 
Source: Our elaboration on NBER Patent Database 
 
Table 5: Description of variables 
Label  Description 
Dependent variables 
SELF  Average share of self-citations calculated on 1995-1999 patents 
granted by US State divided by the average share of State 
patents on total patent (upper bound).  (State patent = first 
inventor located in the State.) 
Predictors 
ALPHA  Estimated alpha parameter of a Pareto distribution for each State 
firm size distribution measured by employees 
AVG  First moment of the State firm size distribution measured by 
employees in 2000 
SKEW  Skewness coefficient of the State firm size distribution measured 
by employees in 2000 
DEPT  State average of the ratio between the number of subsidiaries in 
the same State and the sales of the firm, in 2000 
Controls 
POP  State population in 2000 
DENS  State population per square mile in 2000 
KAP  State average industry capital intensity, measured as the ratio 
between book value of plant and property and number of 
employees in 2000 
BACH  Share of State population with a Bachelor degree in 2000 
R&D  State R&D expenditures over GDP in 2000   28   
 
 
Table 6: Dependent variables and predictors, basic statistics 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
SELF  52  61.51  30.70  2.69  197.42 
ALPHA  52  0.511  0.022  0.453  0.574 
AVG  52  119.17  47.45  49.17  296.18 
SKEW  52  23.54  3.52  14.93  32.26 
DEPT  52  0.008  0.005  0  0.02 
POP  52  5,317,631  6,239,022  493,792  35,100,000 
DENS  52  365.64  1,289.93  0.55  9,378.02 
KAP  52  4.12  1.17  1.45  15.07 
BACH  52  0.24  0.04  0.14  0.39 





Table 7:  Regression results, dependent variable share of self-citations upper bound, 
robust OLS (52 observations) 
  Models 
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
ALPHA  -2.727** 
(0.821) 
-2.439** 
(0.840)   
 
     
AVG 
 
  0.223** 
(0.096) 
0.205** 
(0.094)       
SKEW 









(78.834)   
185.76** 






























































































R-Sq.  0.304  0.396  0.300  0.350  0.321  0.359  0.280 
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Graph 1:  Share of self-citations (upper and lower bound), patent per assignee and total 
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Source: Our elaboration on NBER Patent Database 
 
 
 
(a) 
(b) 